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The Nontradable Share Reform in the Chinese Stock Market 
 
Summary 
Nontradable shares (NTS) are an unparalleled feature of the ownership structure of 
Chinese listed companies and represented a major hurdle to domestic financial market 
development. After some failed attempts, in 2005 the Chinese authorities have launched 
a structural reform program aiming at eliminating NTS. In this paper, we evaluate the 
stock price effects of the actual implementation of this reform in 368 firms. The NTS 
reform generated a statistically significant 8 percent positive abnormal return over the 
event window, adjusting prices for the compensation requested by tradable 
shareholders. Results are consistent with the expectation of improved economic 
fundamentals such as better corporate governance and enhanced liquidity. 
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The Chinese equity market has several distint characteristics and segmentation is certainly one of 
the most prominent. Chinese listed firms have multiple classes of shares outstanding: shares which 
can be traded by domestic investors (A-shares), shares denominated in foreign currencies and 
reserved for foreign investors (B-shares), and shares of companies listed or cross-listed overseas (H-
shares, for those listed in Honk Kong).
3 
Split-share structures are common around the world and typically warrant to owners different rights 
(Faccio and Lang, 2002). Yet an unparalleled feature of ownership structures in China are non-
tradable shares (NTS) entitling the holders to exactly the same voting and cashflow rights assigned 
to the holders of tradable shares (TS) but which cannot traded publicly even if the company is 
listed. Typically these shares belong to the State or to domestic financial institutions ultimately 
owned by central or local governments. 
NTS shares have been issued to the founders of a corporation, business partners or employees and 
served two main purposes: to keep firmly in government’s hands the control of State-owned 
enterprises that were floated in the market, and to maximize IPO proceeds. Indeed, a fraction of 
capital was suppressed, reducing supply and pushing up the price of tradable shares. As Figure 1 
shows, NTS turned out to be overwelmingly important in Chinese stock markets. As of February 
2006, they account for 55 percent of the total number of shares outstanding, most of the NTS being 
represented by state-owned shares. 
In fact, the Government and the regulatory authorities soon recognized that the predominance of 
NTS constituted a problem for the market from several points of view. First, the holders of TS were 
typically minority shareholders with limited power to affect management decisions. Second, the 
limited free float available made the domestic market extremely illiquid, volatile and thus prone to 
market manipulation and insider trading. Third, the inefficiency of the domestic market induced 
many valuable Chinese companies to list overseas, Hong Kong being one of the most preferred 
destinations. This adversely affected domestic investors who, prevented to invest in the best 
companies, were stuck with holdings the less performing local companies.  
                                                 
3 Market segmentation is relevant for pricing. Mei, Scheinkman and Xiong (2005) compare the performance of A and B 
shares for 75 companies for the period 1993-2001, finding a 421.8% premium for A shares over B shares regardless of 
equal property rights on dividends. Chen and Xiong (2001) study the irregularly scheduled auctions and OTC 
transactions of NTS and find an average discount of 81% with respect to their floating counterpart. 
   3
Chinese authorities have tried to deal with the problem of NTS on several occasions, particularly in 
1999 and 2001. In the first attempt, two companies were selected to sell their state shares to the 
floating shareholders. The experiment was not well received by the investors and within 15 days 
from the announcement of the transfer program the share price of the two companies fell about 40 
percent. The second attempt failed badly in 2001 reportedly because the proposal envisaged an 
equal pricing for tradable and non-tradable shares.   
In January 2004, the Chinese government mentioned officially NTS as a major hurdle for domestic 
financial development and stated its commitment to face the problem in the immediate future. On 
April 29, 2005 the China  Securities  Regulatory  Commission (CSRC) announced a new pilot 
program, inviting a first batch of four companies to transform NTS into TS by compensating 
existing shareholders through various ways like bonus shares, cash, and options. The main 
difference from previous attempts is that the new reform invites non-tradable and tradable 
shareholders to bargain over the transfer of NTS. Such flexibility seemed to work well. Among the 
four pilot companies, only Tsinghua Tongfang failed to pass its reform proposal due to floating 
shareholders' discontent about compensation. 
On June 2005, the CSRC initiated the second pilot the program involving 42 companies worth 10% 
of overall stock market value. On August 19, this second program was succesfully accomplished. A 
few daus later the government issued guidelines to extend the reform share project to the rest of the 
stock market, setting the end of 2006 as the deadline of the process. In order to provide further 
incentives to the companies, the CSRC encouraged all mainland-listed companies to turn 
nontradable into tradable shares and stated that reform-compliant companies would be given 
priority to raise new capital (new issues of shares and IPOs have been frozen since the launch of the 
first pilot program). To facilitate the reform, the Chinese government has also taken a series of 
measures to help stabilize the stock market.
4 
At the end of March 2006, 769 listed companies had either completed or initiated their NTS reform 
process (see Figure 2). Should the process be accomplished for the whole stock market within the 
expected deadline, it would represent one of the most important experiments of structural reform 
ever attempted in a emerging stock market. 
This paper provides an early evaluation of the stock price effects of the reform process. Being a 
major structural change in the Chinese stock market, this reform may have important effects on the 
                                                 
4 At the end of January, 2006, a new law was enacted to facilitate the acquisition of stakes in listed companies by 
strategic investors; under the new regulation purchases of A-shares are not reserved any longer to the small group of 
qualified investors but extended to all the investors willing to buy a minimum stake of 10% of the company and hold 
the shares for longer than three years. Furthermore, the Company Law and the Securities Law has been recently 
amended to strengthen the legal framework concerning the capital market.   4
prices of stocks. Under the efficient markets hypothesis the price of a stock equals the present 
discounted value of the fundamentals. There are several reasons to believe that the reform could 
impact market economic fundamentals of Chinese listed firms. First, once all NTS become tradable, 
the company would have better governance as minority shareholders might play an increased role in 
management decisions. Second, the reform will facilitate privatization via secondary equity 
issuance, curbing political interference in firms and boosting operating performance. Third, the 
market would expect better liquidity for the stock given the substantial increase in the free float. 
Finally, the market would also definitely resolve uncertainty about the timing of the reform process, 
with positive effects on valuation. However, disentangling the effects of improved fundamentals is 
not trivial given the complexity of a price discovery process affected by compensation mechanisms 
and the expectations of future supply shocks.  
In this paper we study empirically the price effects of the NTS reform. We conduct an event study 
on 368 companies that accomplished the NTS reform process. We isolate two event windows for 
each stock, related to the institutional detail of the implementation designed by Chinese regulators. 
The reason why we analyze two events is that the reform process implies two suspensions and two 
readmissions for each stock. The two readmission dates represent therefore moments at which we 
can assess the reaction of the price to the information released during the suspension periods. We 
analyze whether there was any abnormal reaction of prices over periods of twenty days centered on 
the event date. Our results can be summed up as follows: first, there is a runup in prices over the 
periods preceding the first suspension, especially in the two-three days prior to the suspension 
which is likely due to an information leakage. Second, the abnormal increase in prices continues 
throughout the process until the second suspension, which is the record date for the distribution of 
the compensation. Third, there is a large drop in prices after the second admission. However, the 
drop in price is explained by the compensation mechanism, mainly taking the form of emission of 
new bonus shares. The adjustment of prices ex bonus reveals a further but temporary increase in 
prices. The overall effect on shareholders wealth of the reform appears significant both statistical 
and economic terms.  
After this introduction, section 2 describes the mechanics of the stock reform process, followed by 
Section 3 developing the conceptual framework the empirical test. Section 4 describes the event 
study, the econometric methodology and the results. Section 4 concludes.   
 
 
   5
2. The mechanics of the NTS reform and its implementation 
 
On September 5
th, 2005, CSRC issued the “Measures on administration of split share structure 
reform of listed companies”, the first official document providing details about the implementation 
of NTS reform. Taking stock of previous failures, the new program followed some key principles. It 
decentralized decision making at the firm level, by allowing shareholders to bargain over the 
method and terms of the compensation. Furthermore, it dealt with the stock overhang problem by 
introducing lockup periods. 
As Inoue (2005) observes, decentralization allowed the government to elicit a variety of proposals 
from shareholders and to avoid one-size-fits-all solution which could move the market in one 
direction. Furthermore, by allowing bargaining the terms of the transfer, the government implicitly 
endorsed the view that the owners of TS could be compensated in some way for any losses 
stemming from the reform. Even if the logical underpinning for compensation is debatable, the fact 
that NTS shares were sold at a significant discount at irregularly scheduled auctions and private 
placements (Chen and Xiong, 2001) and that the market adversely reacted at previous 
announcements supported this view. 
The program addressed also the effect of price volatility by requiring the suspension of trading 
around the critical dates of the implementation of the reform, and the effect of a possible massive 
future supply of shares. In particular, a 12 month lockup period is established for the holders of 
NTS. Furthermore, in the two years after expiration of the lock-up, a holder of NTS with more than 
5% of the total issued share capital of the listed company is further prohibited from trading on the 
stock exchange more than 5% (10%) of the company’s total share capital within 12 (24) months. 
Furthemore, the company and the controlling shareholder are entitled to stabilize the market price 
of the shares for example through buy-backs  (Wan, Yuan and Ha, 2005). 
Furthermore, shareholders owning more than 5 percent of a company’s NTS will be not permitted 
to sell more than 5 percent for 12 months (or more than 10 percent for 24 months) after the 
expiration of the one year lock up period. 
The guidelines established the following stages for the implementation of the reform:
5 
1.  holders of NTS request the board of directors to start the reform process; 
                                                 
5 See Jingu (2006) and Wan, Yuan and Ha (2005) for more detailed descriptions of the process.   6
2.  the board must seek the cooperation of an external sponsoring institution and of a law firm 
to draft the proposal. The sponsor must consult the stock exchange about the feasibility of 
the proposal
6 and arrange a meeting with the relevant market shareholders; 
3.  date 0 t : the board of directors then publicizes the date of the shareholders’ meeting, a 
description of the reform proposal as well as the opinions of the recommending institution 
and the law firm. Trading in the shares of the stock is immediately suspended; 
4.  within date  0 t +10 the board of directors and holders of NTS interact with holders of TS to 
receive comments and suggestions and form a consensus on the proposal; 
5.  if no change is carried out then a public announcement is made and trading is resumed (date 
1 t ), otherwise some more days may pass before resumption of trading until all shareholders 
firmly agree on a given proposal. Importantly, proposals cannot be modified further after 
trading resumes; 
6.  registration starts for the shareholdeers’meeting (date  2 t ) and trading is suspended for the 
second time; 
7.  the shareholders’ meeting is held. The proposal needs a qualified majority of two-thirds of 
the participants. If the proposal is accepted the board must publicize the timetable for actual 
implementation of the reform. Trading is restarted after the shareholder meeting ratifying 
the completion of the reform (date 3 t ). 
The NTS Reform kicked off on May 9 2005, when the four companies of the first batch (Tsingua 
Tongfang, Hebei Jinniu Energy Resources, Shanghai Zi Jiang Enterprise Group, and Sany Heavy 
Industry) published the announcement of the start of the process. Three out of four companies 
accomplished successfully the transfer program in 35 days on average. They were followed by a 
second batch involving 42 companies. The duration of the programs of this batch ranged from 35 to 
60 days, with an average of approximately of 47 days. As of March 2006, 28 batches has been 
launched involving a total of 769 companies (more than a half of listed companies), and 585 out of 
these have succesfully completed the reform. There are 21.6 companies per batch on average and 
the average duration of process is 37 days (see Table 1). The program is still underway and will 
likely involve the the entire market within 2006.     
Compensation played an important role in the NTS reform package and took various forms such as 
cash, warrants, stock splits, and most frequently bonus shares. The terms of the compensation 
                                                 
6 The stock exchange neither “approves” the proposal nor provides any judgement on the amount of the proposed 
compensation, but just advises the company on the technical aspects of the proposal.   7
varied from company to company but it was generally based on the assumption of a substantial 
price drop in the aftermath of the implementation of the reform. Each company thus estimated its 
price/earning ratio or Net Asset Value once all shares were tradable and established the number of 
(existing) NTS to be transferred to tradable sharaholders as a compensation for this loss. For 
example, suppose that the market value of a company is 100 renminbi before and 80 renminbi after 
the reform, and that there are 10 TS and 10 NTS outstanding. TS lose 10 renminbi and will be made 
indifferent by receiving 2.5 NTS per 10 NTS shares owned.  
We have been able to find detailed information about the compensation plan for 476 companies 
which have completed the reform process by the end of March, 2006.
7 In 436 cases, compensation 
took the form of free distribution of bonus shares. In other 23 cases, compensation was 
supplemented by payment of cash. In the remaining cases, it takes the form of stock splits, options 
or pure cash payment. We can thus conclude that in the large majority of cases TS shareholders 
have been compensated by means of bonus shares.  
On average, companies in the first batch transferred 3.26 shares per 10 shares to tradable 
shareholders in order to make all their shares tradable, while those involved in the second round 




According to the efficient markets hypothesis, a stock price is equal to the expectation of the future 
fundamentals. A reform process as the one described in the previous section might well affect the 
fundamentals of Chinese stocks. Once all shares become tradable, the public shareholders and 
State-owned financial institution may divest part of their holdings in secondary equity issues. 
Several studies have documented strong improvements in corporate governance following 
privatization, generally leading to better monitoring of management and more efficient decisions 
boosting profitability and dividends and also curbing risks (Megginson and Netter, 2001, Bortolotti 
and Siniscalco, 2004). Furthermore, the implementation of a NTS process could be associated with 
an improved liquidity of shares in the future. Indeed, the increased public float in the market should 
reduce the likelihood of information trading and thus the bid-ask spread, i.e. the premium that 
speculators and dealers charge to liquidity traders (Glosten and Milgrom, 1985; Kyle, 1985).
8 
                                                 
7 We thank Takeshi Inoue (Nomura Institute of Capital Market Research) for kindly providing us with these data. 
8 Recent literature has documented the relation between liquidity and expected returns, showing empirically the 
existence of a liquidity premium (Amihud and Mendelson, 2001, Acharya and Pedersen, 2002).   8
Improved market fundamentals in terms of corporate governance and liquidity could push up the 
prices of the stocks experiencing the reform, even though this effect could be partly offset by the 
future supply of shares assuming downward sloping demand for stocks. 
The null hypothesis that we test is that no price change is associated with the announcement and 
implementation of NTS reform for a given listed company. This hypothesis is consistent with the 
idea that the no change in economic fundamentals is expected from such reform and that a future 
supply shock will completely offset the upward shift in demand due to improved governance and 
liquidity. 
However, the empirical test of this hypothesis is not trivial because the observed price changes will 
be also affected by the compensation offered to holders of TS. Furthermore, the economic relevance 
of NTS reform announcements at the company level is not easy assess given the extensive 
information already publicly avaiblable. In the next section, we will describe how we try to deal 
with both issues in our event study. 
 
4. The event study 
 
4.1 Price discovery and adjustment around NTS reform 
 
The analysis of the institutional details of the NTS reform described in Section 2 identifies two 
periods of trading suspension which differ both in terms of length and most of all in terms of the 
quantity of information revealed to the market. 
In particular, the first suspension period spanning from  0 t to  1 t  is crucial because it conveys the 
news that the firm has officially entered the process, and it comprises all the negotiations between 
holders of NTS and holders of TS, with the resulting outcome disclosed at the end. The second 
period seems less relevant as it includes only the formal approval of the proposal, previously agreed 
upon on the part of the shareholders. Such ratification can generally be taken for granted. Indeed, all 
the possible changes to initial proposals have already been discussed during the first suspension 
period. Furthermore, virtually all of the reform proposals licensed at the end of the first period have 
been accepted at the relevant shareholders’ meeting. 
This reform design fits well with the empirical analysis and allows us to interpret the reaction of 
prices. Any price change taking place from the start date  0 t  to the end of the first suspension period   9
1 t should be interpreted as a reaction to the new information carried by the final proposal. Any price 
change occurring between the first readmission  1 t and the second suspension  2 t could be interpreted 
in terms of delayed reaction to the new information carried out by the proposal. Any price change 
taking place between the second suspension  2 t and second readmission  3 t  should be interpreted as a 
reaction to the payment of the compensation to shareholders. 
Let’s examine the first price changes in detail. If the market were totally surprised by the 
announcement that the company enters the reform process then the price change might potentially 
be very large. All the factors which have been mentioned in the introduction potentially affecting 
economic fundamentals would be relevant.  
It is however unlikely that the price would react to all of these factors at the first announcement 
date. It was noted in the introduction that on August 24
th, 2005, after the first two pilot projects, the 
government issued guidelines to extend the reform share project to the rest of the stock market, 
setting the end of 2006 as the deadline of the process. August 24
th is therefore a candidate date 
when the market should have discounted all the various benefits of the reform proposal for all 
Chinese companies. Uncertainty persisted about exactly when each company would start and finish 
the process, but such uncertainty was relatively limited given the short time frame (16 months) 
explicitly imposed by the government to complete the process for all the companies. Such a time 
frame is very short if we compare it to the very long period of time over which the reform process 
should display most of its positive effects. Indeed, the reform should affect permanently a number 
of variables outlined, particularly efficiency and therefore operating profits. When the price of the 
stock discounts the expected dividends for all the infinite future, there shoud be a strong reaction to 
an improvement in fundamentals. It follows that the change between the price at date  1 t  and the 
price at date  1 0 − t  may not be as large because the price on the latter date already discounted many 
relevant effects. 
On the other hand, price discovery process has hardly been a linear process on the part of Chinese 
investors. Investors have been swayed back and forth by the fear that the reform process may 
adversely affect the stock market and by the belief that the process may eventually be beneficial. 
The early reaction was negative. The government announced the first batch on April 29
th, 2005, at 
the beginning of an extended period of weakness bringing the SSE Composite Index from 1,169 on 
April 28
th to 1,013 on June 3
rd. This period includes May 9
th, the day of the first suspension of the 
four pilot companies in the first batch. The China Daily, on the basis of interviews with local 
security analysts, reported on May 10
th that “some investors worried that they may not get sufficient 
compensation…but some investors also bought actively on stocks that market rumours said might   10
become the next pilot firms to try the nontradable share sell-off scheme. The short-term impact of 
the news of the nontradable share flotation could be limited as regulators will not allow all 
nontradable shares to flood the market in one go…But in the long run, the flotation of these shares 
may push down average price/earnings ratios and further polarize share prices”. 
Yet subsequent reactions have been much more positive. On June 21st, Dow Jones Newswires 
reports that “investors have reacted warmly to a large expansion in China's trial program to float 
nontradable shares, interpreting the bigger-than-expected size and scope of the second batch of 
firms tapped to participate as a sign of the government's commitment to, and confidence in, the 
reform process”. Therefore only few weeks after a period of deep falls in stock prices, and only few 
days after a negative reaction to the start of the reform process, investors welcomed the news that 
the government was taking seriously the NTS process and starting to involve large and well-known 
companies. The market went up almost 3% on June 20th, after the announcement about the second 
batch made over the previous week-end of the 18th and 19th of June. But then the market lost about 
10% between the end of June and early July. On August 24th, the day of the announcement of the 
extension of the reform to all the Chinese companies, the market went up 1.5%. 
These observations depict an uncertain price discovery process faced by Chinese investors, caught 
between the fear of a supply shock and the hope of improving fundamentals. They also show that 
the market as a whole reacted to the new information acquired by the evolution of companies 
undergoing the reform. This implies that the price change on the day of the first readmission for any 
given company joining the process should not be naively interpreted as a reaction to a completely 
unexpected event. Investors have had time to adjust valuation to take into account that sooner or 
later each company would enter the reform process. Therefore they have had time to adjust 
valuation to expectations of improving future fundamentals as well as to expectations of increasing 
future supply of the stock. The price change after the first readmission must be interpreted as the 
reaction to the final resolution of uncertainty about the timing of NTS reform and to the difference 
between the program initially revealed by the company and the one agreed upon by all shareholders. 
As to the price change between the second suspension and the second readmission, no reaction 
should be expected as far as information about fundamentals is concerned, for the reasons outlined 
above. However, date  3 t  represents the completion of the reform process, involving payment of the 
compensation from holders of NTS to holders of TS. The specific type of compensation may 
therefore affect the market price of the stock simply because of accounting issues, very much like in 
the case of distribution of a dividend, which does not change the total wealth of the shareholder but 
deeply affects how his wealth is kept in the form of cash and shares.   11
We have seen in Section 2 that shareholders have been typically compensated by bonus shares. The 
scheme foresees that holders of NTS offer holders of TS a certain number of their shares (SH) 
and/or a certain amount of Yuan (CASH) for every 10 shares. We compute the compensation-
corrected price by assuming that the stock price should react in such a way that the total wealth of 
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where  0 p  is the price before the second suspension,  1 p  is the price after the second suspension, 
QTS is the number of outstanding TS. Rearranging we get: 























, and COMP is 
the total compensation The larger are the factors Sh_Comp and Cash_Comp the larger is the 
negative jump in the stock price. 
The impact of the payment of the compensation on the price of TS should be large and materialize 
after the first and the second resumption of trading,  1 t and 3 t , respectively. Indeed, after the 
compensation package has been agreed upon, shares will be start trading cum bonus. On the day of 
the second readmission, namely the record date for the issue, price shoul fall as it happens when 
dividends are distributed.   
 
4.2 Sample and estimation 
 
We started with the 585 companies listed in Shanghai and Shenzen stock exchanges which have 
completed the reform program before March 31
st 2006. We have then collected data on daily prices 
for these stocks from Datastream and on the compensation schemes, endind up with a sample of 
386 companies. For all these, we identified the four critical announcement dates: (i) the start date of 
the reform process, time  0 t ; (ii) the date of the resumption of trading after discussion of the 
compensation plan, time  1 t ; (iii) the record date for registered shareholders, time  2 t ; (iv) the date of 
the second resumption after shareholders meeting and share distribution, time  3 t . 
For each company involved in the NTS reform process we estimate a CAPM equation:   12
it Mt i i it r r ε β α + + =  
over an estimation period including observations between  0 t -120 and  0 t -10, where  0 t  is start date 
of the process. Define with  i i b a ,  the estimated parameters. Such parameters are used to estimate 
the abnormal returns over the event windows: 
Mt i i it it r b a r ar − − =  
The abnormal returns are then summed to form company specific cumulative abnormal returns 
(CAR) defined as: 










where T is the length of the event window. The event window extends before and after the specific 
event date. For example, if the event date is the first re-admission  1 t , we are be interested in 
computing the abnormal returns for 10 days before the readmission and 10 days after the 
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Notice that the summation is divided by a number of firms that depends on the specific calendar 
date, as we have to allow for different event periods for the various firms for the interval between 
the first readmission and the second suspension. Remember in fact that such an interval is not fixed 
and may differ across firms depending on the timing of the reform process. In several cases this 
time interval is very short, of the order of 3-4 days; in other cases this time period is long, extending 
beyond 10-15 days. It follows that for a given horizon, e.g. 10 days, we can compute the cumulative 
abnormal return for a number of firms that is different from the number of firms over which we can 
compute abnormal returns for a different horizon.
9 
In order to test for the existence of non-negative cumulative abnormal returns we need to estimate 
the variance of the average CARs. We measure such a variance in two different ways. The first 
approach is the cross-sectional variance across cumulative abnormal returns of the different 
                                                 
9 For example suppose we want to compute a 5 day return after the first readmission. We will be able to consider all the 
companies for which the date of the second suspension is 5 days away from the first readmission. If we compute a 10 
day return we will only be able to consider all the companies for which the date of the second suspension is 10 days 
away from the date of the first readmission. The second set of companies is a subset of the first set of companies.  
Obviously, for event windows going back before the first suspension and going forward after the second readmission 
there are no differences across firms.   13
companies (see Lynch and Mendenhall, 1997). This is simply the cross sectional variance of the 






















The second approach is to assume normality and independence of residuals across securities taking 
into account sampling error for estimated parameters, using the estimator described by Campbell, 
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where  i V  is the variance of the i-th company. The company variance is computed as: 
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where  i X  is the matrix of regressors (the constant and the market return in this case) used in the 
estimation period and 
*
i X  is the matrix of the same variables over the event window.  










which is asymptotically standard normal, where the variance is alternatively computed either from 




Table 2 reports results of the CAR analysis for all the companies included in our sample. In the first 
estimation window covering the pre-announcement period of NTS reform for a given company, 
CAR starts to become significant 2 days before the first suspension (see Panel A). The CAR is 
about 1 percent the day before the announcement and strongly statistically significant in both 
version of the test. The abnormal returns on the day before the initial announcement suggest the 
existence of substantial information leakages about the timing of the reform. 
The second window is particularly important for the aim of our analysis in that it allows measuring 
the market reaction to the resolution of uncertainty about the NTS reform program and about the   14
compensation package.We strongly reject the null hypothesis with both versions of the test. Indeed, 
the actual implementation of the reform has been accompanied by a significant abnormal return 
both in statistical and economic terms. In the first day after first resumption of trading, we 
document an excess return of 2.6 percent, which keeps momentum for the entire event window to 
finally grow to more than 5 percent. 
A similar reaction is observed during the third estimation window, covering the period before the 
record date for registered shareholders. We also observe a strong and statistically significant run up 
in prices starting nine days before the event, with at CAR reaching 2 percent at the end of the 
period.  
The fourth estimation window starts from the date of the shareholder meeting and of the issue of 
bonus shares. Not surprisingly, we find an average large drop in prices, amounting to about 20%  
(not reported in the table) which is largely attributable to the fact that stock traded from the record 
date ex bonus. Panel 4 reports the analysis of abnormal residuals derived from compensation-
adjusted prices, using the formula presented in Section 4.1. The table shows that, even after 
accounting for market movements and compensation, prices still increase on average 2%, even 
though this effect is temporary. Over the following 10 days in fact prices fall by about the same 
amount. 
Finally, we have performed a preliminary analysis of the cross-sectional determinants of the daily 
CARs in the day after the first resumption of trading  1 t . As explanatory variables, we have included 
COMP, the total compensation defined in Section 4.1, and the total number of tradable shares 
outstanding before the reform, QTS. We try to control for firm characteristics by using the price-to-
book ratio (PTB), and size, gived by the (log of) market capitalization MV. A cross sectional 
regressions of abnormal returns yielded the following result: 
 
CAR( 1 t ) = 5.018 - .005 COMP - .064 QTS + .040 PTB - .0333 MV 01 .
2 = R  
     (1.92)    (-1.18)       (-2.43)         (.20)           (-.11) 
 
(t-values in parentheses below the coefficients) 
 
The poor fit of our regressions does not allow drawing any conclusive evidence. Yet an interesting 
result is that the terms of the compensation appear quite irrelevant in explaing the abnormal returns 
accompanying the first resumption of trading. Indeed, the variable COMP is never statistically 
significant at conventional levels. On the contrary, the quantity of tradable shares outstanding seems   15
to matter. Companies entering the reform process with a larger percentage of NTS experienced a 
more pronounced positive abnormal return, suggesting that the positive effects on corporate 




Our empirical analysis has shown that the structural reform currently taking place in the Chinese 
market had strong effects on prices. Such effects are generally positive. Prices of the companies that 
transformed NTS into TS experienced some increase before the announcement of the 
implementation of the stock reform, and rose strongly throughout the process, i.e. between the first 
announcement and the second suspension. TS prices increase also once the reform is accomplished 
and compensation is paid, even though this latter increase is temporary and disappears within the 
following ten days. Overall we estimate that thanks the NTS reform, total shareholder wealth 
increased reform increases about 8%, after correcting for bonus share issues: 1% before the first 
suspension, 5% after the first suspension, building up gradually from an initial rise of 2.5% on the 
day of the first readmission, and finally 2% before the second suspension. 
Preliminary results from cross-sectional analysis suggest that compensation did not play a major 
role in explaining initial the abnormal returns. Rather, improvements in economic fundamentals 
seem to account for the price effects of this important structural reform that we document. 
Exploring further these issues appears an interesting avenue for future research. 
   16
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Figure 1. Outstanding Shares of Chinese Listed Companies by Class, February 2006 
 
Source: China Securities Regulatory Commission 
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Table 1. Implementation of the NTS Reform Process 
 
Batch #  Launch Date 





Duration of NTS 
Process (days) 
Average % of 
NTS outstanding 
1 05/09/05  3  35.33  66.62 
2 06/20/05 42  47.52  67.11 
3 09/12/05 40  37.70  65.70 
4 09/19/05 38  37.45  65.45 
5 09/26/05 21  35.86  66.53 
6 10/10/05 20  36.95  60.45 
7 10/17/05 21  38.33  60.16 
8 10/24/05 17  37.59  60.17 
9 10/31/05 17  41.53  61.64 
10 11/07/05 18  34.78  57.14 
11 11/14/05 20  33.65  63.73 
12 11/21/05 17  34.71  60.52 
13 11/28/05 21  33.90  59.73 
14 11/30/05  1  30.00  52.67 
15 12/05/05 20  38.85  61.82 
16 12/12/05 20  35.25  59.73 
17 12/19/05 27  33.33  62.77 
18 12/23/05 37  36.46  60.95 
19 12/31/05 17  43.82  62.38 
20 01/05/06  1  36.00  65.48 
22 01/09/06 13  41.54  63.28 
23 01/16/06 21  42.76  63.58 
24 01/23/06 43  41.44  57.16 
25 02/13/06 35  29.86  59.58 
26 02/20/06 31  30.87  59.77 
27 02/27/06 19  27.79  64.67 
28 03/06/06  5  22.60  59.49 
Total   585  37.06  62.05 
0 t








End of NTS reform
1st suspension 2nd suspension
1st window 2nd window 3rd window 4th window  19
Table 2: CARs around event dates 
 
This table reports the cumulative abnormal returns estimated over four periods where  0 t  is start date of the NTS reform 
process,  1 t  is the date of the resumption of trading after discussion of the compensation plan,  2 t  is the record date for 
registered shareholders,  3 t is the date of the second resumption after shareholders meeting and share distribution. t-tests 
calculated using cross sectional variance and the estimator by Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay (CLM) (1997). 
 
Panel A 
Day  CARs before  0 t   t-test using cross sectional 
variance 
t-test using CLM variance 
-9  0.03   0.37   0.50  
-8  0.23   1.89   3.01 
-7  0.10   0.65   1.12  
-6  0.17   0.96   1.63  
-5  -0.01   -0.08   -0.13  
-4  -0.21   -1.03   -1.64  
-3  0.09   0.40   0.67  
-2  0.49   1.83   3.27  




CARs after  1 t  
 
t-test using cross sectional 
variance 
t-test using CLM variance 
1  2.62   11.07   23.73  
2 2.86  9.60    18.44   
3  3.11   9.49   16.17  
4  3.42   9.47   14.83  
5  3.69   8.82   13.12  
6  4.00   8.13   11.75  
7  4.21   6.97   9.88  
8  4.85   6.70   9.57  
9  4.87   5.74   8.08  




CARs before  2 t  
 
t-test using cross sectional 
variance 
t-test using CLM variance 
-10  -0.18   -1.41   -1.70  
-9  0.32   1.81   2.08  
-8  0.90   4.47   4.74  
-7  1.00   4.17   4.39  
-6  1.15   4.04   4.11  
-5  1.54   4.69   4.56  
-4  1.56   3.74   3.67  
-3  1.84   3.65   3.65  
-2  1.64   2.64   2.72  
-1  1.98   2.77   2.89 
Panel D 
  CARs  after  3 t  
 
t-test using cross sectional 
variance 
t-test using CLM variance 
1  1.99   3.00   16.45  
2  1.49   2.22   9.20  
3  1.09   1.62   5.56  
4  0.69   1.02   3.06  
5  0.59   0.86   2.34  
6  0.38   0.56   1.39  
7  0.25   0.36   0.85  
8  0.17   0.25   0.54  
9  0.44   0.64   1.31  
10 0.19  0.28    0.54   
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